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Introduction
The job of most history and social science is to summarize, codify and otherwise "package" important social movements and major historical events, to make them legible and understandable. Given this objective and the fact that the events they are seeking to illuminate have already happened, it is hardly surprising that historians and social scientists should typically give short shrift to the confusion, flux and tumultuous contingency experienced by the historical actors, let alone the ordinary by-standers, whose actions they are examining. 1 This description of academic practice points to the way(s) scholars create and employ narratives to explain the real world of human action. Narratives, in this context, are sensemaking devices that ascribe meanings to people, places and events. They are signifiers -a type of intellectual shorthand that allows us to quickly convey taken-for-granted assumptions -that become embedded within institutions and their policies. In doing so, they move from being theoretical heuristics that provide a plausible explanation for a particular phenomenon, to a basis for action. In short, they become endogenous to the policy process -they exist within it and are produced by it.
2 If this all sounds too esoteric, consider this example of immediate relevance to democratic practice in the Pacific Islands. At a recent donor funded meeting participants -mostly politicians and senior civil servants -were asked to split into three groups to discuss the workshop's papers on democracy and democratisation and propose solutions. Seamlessly, Melanesian, Polynesian and Micronesian groupings (luckily Fiji wasn't represented so there was no confusion) appeared and what began as an early (often racialist) European representation of diversity, that later informed colonial administrative policy 3 , came full circle as the 'subjects' of study acted out its findings.
Narratives, in short, influence how we understand the social world and act within it.
In -the collapse of democratic government -has failed to eventuate.
The standard move in the existing literature on democracy, both in the Pacific and elsewhere, is to identify and privilege the significance of certain explanatory variables and then make causal inferences about their impact on democratic transition and practice. In this article I By showing how storylines are used to simultaneously perpetuate a sense of 'crisis' and 'persistence', I produce a new counter-story that privileges a messy and contingent world of 'narratives-in-interaction', 13 where the rationale for policy interventions are continually coproduced and (re)negotiated, and the purpose of storylines can be gauged by their capacity to influence how political actors make sense of the social world. In which case, to return to the workshop example above, from the vantage point of this article, whether or not participants whole-heartedly agreed with those categorisations is somewhat immaterial; what matters is that they help make sense of the 'confusion, flux and tumultuous contingency' Scott describes. In turn, the significance of this approach for students of politics and would-bereformers of political institutions in the Pacific Islands lies in its capacity to illustrate how taken-for-granted assumptions are embedded within the policy storylines that inform reform efforts. In this respect, the explanatory power of 'crisis' and 'persistence' is coupled to the function of these narratives in the policy process where they unite disparate actors around a common storyline or 'mobilising metaphor'. 14 In doing so they project conceptual coherence where there would otherwise be disorder.
Echoing this, and as with all heuristics, inevitably there a degree of crossover between the six storylines that I outline in Table 1 Hybrid or indigenised democratic institutions build on the strengths of existing mores as exemplified by constitutionally mandated chiefly councils and their equivalents.
State Strength / Fragmentation
Strong regional, island, clan, linguistic and family based identities and patronage undermine the authority of centralised state-based institutions and work against the formation and consolidation of political parties and a national consciousness.
The dispersion of power amongst a host of disparate, non-ideological or class-based political factions ensures that no one group can dominate or capture the institutions and machinery of government.
Scale
Tight social controls demand conformity and work against a pluralist expression of discontent. The threat of social ostracism marginalises political opposition, which in turn facilitates patriarchal authoritarianism and the personalisation of power.
Remoteness and smallness unifies communities around common challenges while the relatively reduced social proximity between leaders and those they govern provides for more direct citizen involvement, accountability and transparency.
Civil Society
Powerful leaders and ruling elites treat their countries as 'fiefdoms' by exercising control over nearly all aspects of political life, thus curtailing opposition, freedom of the press, and other forms of civic activism.
Elite excess and corruption is tempered by the strength of non-government institutions, including churches and trade unions (especially in Fiji), traditional leaders and culturally mandated forms of reciprocity, and the increasing vocality of NGOs with strong online links to overseas communities.
Institutions, Electoral Systems and Constitutions
Ill-designed institutional transfer leads to executive domination and legislative instability that undermines democratic processes leading to coups and constitutional crisis.
Extensive public consultations at independence about the form and function of institutional design and the relatively high reliance of small populations on the civil service for employment ensures the continuation of current institutions.
International Intervention and Foreign Aid
Geo-political manoeuvring, illconceived interventions, and foreign aid dependence perpetuates a handout mentality while the reliance of some economies (Solomon Islands, PNG) on resource extraction industries props up corrupt patronage-based regimes and fuels resource conflict (i.e. Bougainville).
The commitment of international agencies, bilateral donors and regional organisations to democratic government provides a check against authoritarian rule while foreign aid and technical assistance underpins the functioning of governing and regulatory institutions. 15 Consequently, this debate is less about whether prevailing 'pre-modern' dynamics affect contemporary politics -the assumption is that they do -and instead focuses on how they undermine liberal democratic processes, with notions of rank and hierarchy in particular singled out as obstacles to principles like 'one-vote, one-value'.
Writing after the 1987 coup, Fijian academic Asesela Ravuvu described democracy as a 'façade' a 'parting whim of a colonial power that had itself only practised dictatorship' while Peter Larmour's work on institutional transfer highlights the power of the 'foreign flower' metaphor -unable to take root in South Pacific soil -as described by a Fiji Times editorial. 16 These descriptions are particularly pertinent in Fiji, the one Pacific nation that has failed Huntington's 'two turnover test' (concurrent changes of government signify democratic consolidation). 17 Commentators refer to a prevailing 'coup culture' 18 in relation to law and order had become a core plank in donor reform efforts, while democratic practice, characterized by personalisation and the persistence of cultural norms, was cast as the antithesis of these ideals.
Reflecting this concern, fragmentation both as it relates to fluid coalition groupings within parliament and separatist or breakaway movements outside of it, has increasingly been identified as a key factor undermining democratic legitimacy with institutional engineering (electoral systems and constitutions in particular), which I will discuss in greater detail below, partly designed to counter this trend. undermined the liberal project. 32 However, unlike the persistence narrative found in the culturalist perspective, there has been no substantive attempt to draw on the strong tradition in political theory, which can be traced from Aristotle to Arendt and Habermas, which sees many of the characteristics common to politics in the Pacific (personalisation, the absence of parties and professional politicians, weak bureaucratic control) as ideal, and considers participation in public life, as opposed to the pursuit of material aspirations enshrined in the development enterprise, as the primary end of political action.
Scale
Size provides an obvious point of contrast between democracies in the Pacific and those in other parts of the world and yet, by and large, this variable is absent from the analysis of democracy and democratisation in the Pacific where personalisation in particular is seen to be an extension of existing cultural practice, despite its prevalence in other regions like the Caribbean. Conversely, scale is of great concern to some economists who see the isolation and relative dependence of small island states on aid and remittances as detrimental, and in extreme cases fatal, to development and by extension democracy. 33 Following Seymour Martin Lipset's thesis, proponents argue that democratisation is strongly correlated with industrialisation and the rise of an educated middle class. 34 Given the historical absence of these dynamics in the region, and the improbability of large-scale industrialisation occurring in the future, this perspective presumes that the Pacific would be relatively undemocratic.
Adherents cite highly personalised patronage-based 'big man' politics -the term is also used 32 The counter argument can be found in a number of diverse literatures. Political theorists have long argued that 'small is beautiful' when it comes to democratic politics as size limits the number of competing interests. 35 Largely, advocates of this perspective hark back to the writings of Plato and Aristotle and their belief that to maintain a stable polis the entire citizenry should be able to meet together in one place to discuss and debate matters of common concern. 36 Rather than an educated middle-class, democracy enabled humble men (but not women or slaves) of insignificant wealth and lineage to make their own laws; neither of these philosophers thought this radical form of government was optimal. 37 More recently, large comparative studies find a correlation between country size and democratisation, particularly in the Pacific and the Caribbean. 38 To explain this trend, Teresia Teaiwa wonders how Pacific Islanders can 'hold grudges against people whom they cannot avoid, people they are bound to run into at the supermarket, the market or the street, people whom they are often bound by blood and history?' 39 From this perspective, the personalisation of politics reduces the distance between voter and constituent while patronage and cronyism, rather than being symptomatic of democratic crisis, facilitate social integration, thus reinforcing common political dynamics. This view is echoed by Duncan and Woods who show, with reference to the Caribbean, that despite inequality, corruption and violence related to the international drug trade, democracy persists. 40 Indeed, Larmour goes further by arguing that if transnational circumstances (sovereign status and global market conditions) are held constant, then development poses the greatest risk to existing democracies in the Pacific by deepening social conflicts. 41 He reasoned that democracies in PNG and Fiji were in most danger of crisis while countries with relatively smaller economies and little prospect of development are likely to persevere.
Conversely, despite representing the most extreme example of the 'resource curse' or 'Dutch disease', Nauru has not suffered from violent conflict, although John Connell maintains that it is perhaps the Pacific's first truly 'failed' state. 42 
Civil Society
The apparent weakness of civil society actors in the Pacific has been of great concern to democracy promoters. 43 Drawn from Amartya Sen's entitlement theory, although it has deeper roots in the basic needs approaches of the 1970s, this perspective sees an active citizenry as a key building block of democratic consolidation. 44 Unrestrained elite excess is a key concern for Ron Crocombe who claims that many of the region's politicians have treated their countries as personal 'fiefdoms' due to their extensive influence over nearly all aspects of social, economic and political life. 45 His documentation of nepotism under Sir Albert
Henry's government in Cook Islands provides a picture of public life co-opted by one family.
Veteran Pacific reporter Michael Field echoes this sentiment and cites his willingness to criticise political figures as the overriding rationale behind his successive banning from several Pacific Island countries. 46 His colleague, Tonga's Kalafi Moala, was imprisoned for his editorship of the newspaper Taimi 'o Tonga which ran stories that were critical of the ruling monarchy. 47 The gendered nature of parliamentary decision-making in the region has also attracted recent focus amongst civil society organisations. From this standpoint, democratic transparency and representativeness is undermined by the control of the predominantly male elite over countervailing forces, including the media.
Alternatively, Jon Fraenkel argues that most 'Pacific countries have a relatively free press, more or less independent judiciaries and, despite some glaring irregularities, few examples of overtly rigged elections'. 48 In this view, rather than being deliberately crushed, the emergence of a strong civil society has historically suffered from problems associated with relative size, with print and radio media often requiring government subsidies. More recently, the internet provides new forums for political engagement, especially amongst young urban elites and diaspora communities, with numerous Facebook groups and blogs sharing news and information about political events and policy issues. 49 In examining the forty year history of women's organising in Fiji, Nicole George finds that active citizenship both reflects and contests global and locally contingent factors. 50 In Vanuatu, politician Ralph Regenvanu has generated enormous support for his anti-corruption campaign, which has a strong online social network presence amongst young urban constituents. 51 His party platform blends globalised discourses like good governance and transparency with localised concerns about land and custom.
Invariably absent from the avowedly secular concern with governance is recognition that, Finally, while the crisis view of economic conditions common in many Pacific Island countries opposes democratisation in Lipset's thesis, it can also be seen to underlie the persistence of democratic regimes. 59 The Government accounts for more than a third of total employment and 60-65 percent of gross national product in Palau, 60 and while this represents a barrier to neo-liberal development it also means that most families have a personal stake in the persistence of governing institutions and an active interest in the day-to-day political functions and practices. 61 
International Intervention and Foreign Aid
Foreign intervention in Pacific Island affairs began well before the colonial period and each discipline privileges particular analytic frameworks to interpret how past events influence contemporary politics. Historians, for example, use the phrase 'fatal impact' whilst anthropologists often lament the march of modernism and the destruction of cultural heritage and language. 'New Interventionism' is the term used by international relations scholars to describe Australia's 21 st century role in the Pacific. 62 Intervention as a form of crisis also features in neo-Marxist accounts of development assistance in the region, with dependency theorists in particular critical of the way that aid perpetuates the reliance of islanders and island governments on global market forces. 63 At the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, neo-liberals argue that the negative effect of aid -protectionism impedes economic growth -undermines development. As an alternative, they advocate scaling down assistance in favour of free market mechanisms: a non-intervention, intervention. Kumar finds that the impact of the international community has been an important factor in the persistence of legislature in Fiji, despite several coups, while RAMSI was ostensibly mobilised to secure the rule of law and parliamentary democracy. 70 Finally, economists note that despite problems of size, small island states represent an 'empirical anomaly' with higher than average standards of living -derived from skilfully managing the globalization process to generate aid and remittances 71 -which should, according to Lipset, provide a democracy dividend. 72 
Conclusion
Master narratives invariably create counter-narratives just as all policy solutions necessarily create the problematisations they seek to address. Even a development goal like 'good' governance with its seemingly irrefutable positive connotations -nobody champions 'bad' governance -has its critics who either argue that endogenous values are hegemonic, that the targets of such reforms are in fact not as 'bad' as they are made out to be, or that proselytising 'good governance' professionals resemble colonial era missionaries.
In this article I have highlighted how 'crisis' and 'persistence' are co-dependent narratives employed to describe democracy in the Pacific Islands. In doing so I have described six explanatory storylines -culture; state strength / fragmentation; size; civil society; institutions, electoral systems and constitutions; and international intervention and foreign aid -and illustrated how they interact temporally and spatially. I have demonstrated that while some narratives appear to have greater explanatory power in certain contexts -culture in Samoa, institutions in Kiribati, ostracism in pre-reform Tonga, Crocombe's 'fiefdoms' in the 1980s/1990s -we nevertheless commonly draw on multiple storylines to analyse the experiences of individual countries and certain eras, including holding seemingly contradictory views in tension. For example, despite stemming from opposed rationales, AusAID simultaneously funds programs that seek to strengthen political parties with the aim of reducing persistent political instability, whilst also supporting civil society actors who view executive domination as the root cause of democratic crisis. 73 A similar tension is apparent in calls to strengthen institutions and tackle corruption by neo-liberals who concurrently argue for reduced international intervention and a lean and flexible civil service.
In highlighting how different explanatory storylines seek to understand democracy in the Pacific region I have advanced a counter-narrative that privileges a messy and contingent world of 'narratives-in-interaction'. Consequently, while Table 1 , for clarities sake, seeks to provide a sense of conceptual order, policy-making is rarely this coherent but rather appears, discussion points to the urgent need for more work that analyses when and how policy actors employ these storylines in both official and everyday language. The goal of narrative analysis in this context is to describe how narratives interact and explain why their plausibility fluctuates. In turn, this would provide a better sense of when and how different actors unite around a common metaphor and shared repertoire to legitimise and sustain policy interventions. In doing so we are able to strip back the veneer of conceptual coherence and better understand the taken-for-granted assumptions that inform governing practices.
